The Al-Faw Peninsula held the keys to Iraq's oil economy. Ninety percent of the country's oil exports flowed through the peninsula via two offshore gas and oil platforms just miles from its coast. Coalition planners feared Iraq would sabotage the infrastructure, reprising the ecological catastrophe of the 1991 Kuwait oil fires and the massive Persian Gulf oil spill. Beyond the oil, the Khawr Abd Allah waterway ran along the peninsula's edge -- the only route to Umm Qasr, Iraq's sole deep-water port. The Iraqis had mined the waterway during the Gulf War, and coalition intelligence expected them to do it again. But the waterway was too shallow for warships, and the minesweepers needed to clear it were lightly armed and vulnerable to fire from the Iraqi-held eastern bank. Securing Al-Faw was not optional. Without it, neither humanitarian aid nor heavy military equipment could enter Iraq by sea.

The assault unfolded as a tightly choreographed sequence. U.S. Navy SEALs from SEAL Team 3 struck first, landing by MH-53 helicopters to seize the monitoring and metering station and the export pipelines. Simultaneously, Special Boat Team 22 inserted SEAL Teams 8 and 10 to capture the Mina Al Bakr Oil Terminal, while Polish GROM commandos took the Khor Al-Amaya Oil Terminal. Thirty-two Iraqi prisoners were captured and explosive ordnance disposal teams swept the platforms for booby traps. Thirty minutes after the SEALs landed, 800 Royal Marines from 40 Commando arrived by helicopter to take over the MMS and establish a defensive perimeter. Resistance was scattered but real: Iraqi bunkers answered with mortar fire, and sporadic firefights erupted around trenches and gatehouses along the approach to Al-Faw town. AC-130 gunships overhead silenced the mortars. By the time 40 Commando had consolidated its positions, the unit had taken over 200 Iraqi prisoners without suffering a single casualty.

The second wave did not go as planned. At 2225 hours, 42 Commando launched its assault, preceded by artillery fire from batteries positioned on nearby Bubiyan Island and naval bombardment from HMS Richmond, HMS Marlborough, HMS Chatham, and HMAS Anzac. Visibility was terrible -- fires, sand, and a dropping cloud base turned the approach into a pilot's nightmare. As the assault formation turned over the brigade assembly area, a U.S. CH-46 Sea Knight carrying the headquarters of the Brigade Reconnaissance Force crashed. Seven Royal Marines, one Royal Navy operator, and four U.S. Marine Corps aviators died. The commander of the U.S. Marine Air Wing halted further landings. A replacement insertion using RAF Chinook and Puma helicopters was organized for dawn, six hours behind schedule. When 42 Commando finally landed on insecure zones, they took all their objectives. The next day, on 22 March, two Royal Navy Sea King helicopters collided, killing seven more people. The peninsula was being won, but not without cost.

By 24 March, the battle had shifted from commando raids to armored combat. Fourteen Challenger 2 tanks from the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards linked up with 40 Commando and pushed up the peninsula toward Basra along Highway 6. The road was defended by the Iraqi 6th Armoured Division, 18th Infantry Division, and 51st Mechanized Division with an estimated 220 to 250 tanks. An Iraqi armoured brigade launched a counterattack with 60 T-55 tanks. The Challengers engaged directly while calling in A-10 and F/A-18 air strikes. Artillery from 8th Battery, 29 Commando provided additional fire. By day's end, the coalition had destroyed over 20 T-55 tanks; the remainder retreated to Basra. With Al-Faw secured and the route to Umm Qasr declared safe, the British 7th Armoured Brigade could advance on Basra while American forces pressed toward Baghdad, their southern supply lines no longer threatened.