Broodseinde was the third of a new kind of attack developed by the British Second Army under General Plumer. After the costly failures of August, the British had fundamentally changed their approach. Instead of ambitious advances that outran artillery support, they would bite off limited chunks of German territory and hold them against the inevitable counterattacks. Divisions attacked on narrower fronts, advancing no more than a few thousand yards before consolidating. When German counter-attack divisions arrived, they encountered not exhausted troops in chaos but a reciprocal defense in depth, protected by massed artillery. The Germans had undertaken at least 24 counter-attacks since September 20; all had been costly failures.

The German 4th Army had planned Operation High Storm, a methodical counter-attack to recapture ground around Zonnebeke. German troops had assembled in the pre-dawn darkness, ready to advance at the same hour the British barrage was scheduled to begin. When the hurricane bombardment opened at 6:00 AM, it caught the German assault formations in the open. The 45th Reserve Division and the 4th Guard Division, massed for their own attack, were devastated before they could advance a step. As Australian divisions of I Anzac Corps moved forward, they found German soldiers rising from shell holes in no-man's land, caught between their own abandoned attack and the British advance. The Australians fired on the move, destroying the first German wave.

The assault extended across a front involving twelve divisions. The main effort came from the two Anzac Corps. The 1st Australian Division routed German troops and captured field guns along the Broodseinde-Passchendaele road. The 2nd Australian Division overran the German 45th Reserve and 4th Guard divisions, forestalling Operation High Storm before it began. The 3rd Australian Division and the New Zealand Division advanced up Gravenstafel Spur, taking hundreds of prisoners from dugouts along the railway embankment. By mid-morning, most objectives had been captured, and British artillery fired a standing barrage for two and a half hours while infantry dug in undisturbed. Nine Victoria Crosses were awarded for actions on that single day.

The magnitude of the defeat sent shockwaves through the German command. Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote that the British advance had lengthened the front and made defense more difficult. Ludendorff later changed the defensive scheme entirely, dispersing troops in the forward zone and bringing reserve divisions closer to the front. But no tactical adjustment could solve the fundamental problem: the Germans were seeking tactical fixes for an operational dilemma that had no operational answer. The tempo of British attacks and the weight of attrition meant that even divisions rushed to reinforce the 4th Army were either undertrained newcomers or veteran formations demoralized by earlier defeats.

The capture of Broodseinde Ridge opened the southern flank of Passchendaele Ridge to attack. But even as Plumer and his staff discussed exploitation, heavy rain began to fall. The ground that had dried enough to permit the September and early October successes was turning back to mud. Field guns closest to Passchendaele now fired near the limit of their range. The roads and tracks that supplied ammunition and reinforcements dissolved into impassable morasses. Within days, the Battle of Poelcappelle would demonstrate that the winning formula of Broodseinde depended on conditions that no longer existed. The black day of October 4 remained the high-water mark of British tactical success in the Third Battle of Ypres.