The pilot had history with his managers. Four months earlier, an incident at Bintulu Airport had led to accusations of poor airmanship from the fleet manager in Kuching - accusations the captain's first officer disputed. A subsequent review of the captain's flight logs left him feeling unheard. He told colleagues someone in the company was 'out to get him' and expressed fear that his upcoming line check was designed to end his career. He passed the check anyway, but the resentment didn't pass with it. On the morning of 15 September, the fleet manager counseled him one more time on strict adherence to cost-cutting policies. Hours later, the captain boarded a five-year-old Fokker 50, registration 9M-MGH, for the one-hour flight to Tawau.

Air traffic control complicated matters from the start. Flight 2133 was sequenced as number two to land behind a Transmile cargo flight at lower altitude, with a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 737 close behind. Unable to get descent clearance from 17,000 feet, the captain negotiated directly with the lead aircraft's crew to swap positions. The controller approved. But the swap left Flight 2133 far too high and too close to the airport for a normal descent. The first officer warned about excessive speed. The captain maintained it. The first officer warned again. The captain said the approach would be fine as long as they stayed below 160 knots. The Ground Proximity Warning System sounded - a mandatory go-around trigger under Malaysia Airlines' own procedures. The captain ignored it and committed to land.

Tawau's runway was 5,600 feet long. Flight 2133 touched down at three-quarters of its total length, leaving roughly 1,400 feet to stop a turboprop still traveling far above normal landing speed. The brakes could not do what physics would not allow. The Fokker 50 overran the runway and plowed into a settlement of houses beyond the airport perimeter. Eighteen firefighters responded immediately, though crowds of onlookers hampered the rescue effort. The fire burned into the evening. Of the 53 people aboard, 34 died - 32 passengers and both pilots. On the ground, 10 residents were injured and 40 houses were damaged or destroyed. It was the first hull loss of a Fokker 50 anywhere in the world.

The Malaysian Department of Civil Aviation published its final report on 20 May 1998, nearly three years after the crash. Flight recorders were analyzed at the UK's Air Accidents Investigation Branch facility in Farnborough, with representatives from Fokker in the Netherlands, Pratt & Whitney Canada, and the FAA assisting. Investigators blamed the captain's decision to land despite unstable approach conditions, but the report cut deeper than individual error. The airline's culture of cost-cutting and schedule pressure had shaped the captain's calculus. A visual illusion specific to Tawau's approach may have contributed to the crew's misjudgment of altitude. And the first officer, who warned repeatedly but never took control, became a case study in what the industry calls crew resource management failure. Malaysia was directed to make CRM training compulsory for all airlines. The recommendation arrived three years and 34 lives too late.